The December 2025 Warwick fire became the rallying point for the Hudson Valley's moratorium wave. This explains what happened there (twice), what a lithium-ion storage fire involves, how often these fires occur, and how New York has responded — sourced to independent local reporting, fire-safety research, and state government.
On the night of December 19, 2025, a battery-storage container in the Village of Warwick caught fire — the same site’s second serious fire in two and a half years. No one was hurt, and the flames never left the one unit. But the incident became the rallying point for a fresh wave of municipal moratoria across the Hudson Valley, and it is the factual core of the fire-safety argument that recurs in nearly every case on this site. This page lays out what happened at Warwick, then what a lithium-ion storage fire involves more generally — how dangerous, how often, and what rules now apply. Battery-fire risk is a genuinely contested and evolving subject; the aim here is to state what is established, characterize what is uncertain, and not overstate it in either direction.
The facility is Convergent Energy + Power’s Church Street system (“West Warwick 3”), part of a 12 MW project built and energized in 2023. It has caught fire twice.
June 2023. Weeks after coming online, two Convergent units in Warwick — the Church Street site and one on school-district property — caught fire in near-simultaneous incidents during heavy rain. An investigation attributed them to a manufacturing defect in the Powin-built battery units that let water enter the enclosures and cause an electrical fire. (Warwick Advertiser) A state-led review later reported no harmful levels of contaminants had migrated off-site, and the damaged units were to be replaced with hardware meeting enhanced standards. (Warwick Advertiser)
December 2025. The Church Street unit burned again, also during heavy rain. The fire stayed localized to a single container and did not spread. Firefighters did not so much extinguish it as contain it — holding a safety perimeter while the unit burned itself out internally, the standard defensive posture for these fires (see below). Convergent’s statement said the fire was “extinguished within 24 hours”; firefighters on scene described the unit still burning internally over the following days — a discrepancy worth noting. Orange County emergency management ran air monitoring and recorded hydrogen cyanide at 0.5 ppm at a meter just outside the facility — “about half of the maximum allowable amount under federal guidelines” — while downwind monitors read zero. No injuries were reported, and the state DEC noted “a significant reduction from 2023 in the amount of water used.” (News 12) County officials said they were not confirming the presence of any additional chemicals this time, and had declined in 2023 to identify which contaminants were detected — a transparency gap critics have noted. (News 12)
After the December fire, the Village of Warwick Building Department issued a Notice of Violation and a Condemnation Order, stating the facility had no valid Certificate of Compliance and “should not have been operating,” citing the operator’s failure to meet enhanced safety-monitoring requirements imposed after 2023 — requirements village officials say were “dismissed” by the manufacturer and Convergent. The unit was disconnected, internally disengaged, and tarped, with damaged batteries to be removed; the Village notified Convergent it is responsible for all cleanup, testing, and engineering costs, and retained an independent engineer. (News 12; Village of Warwick) Mayor Michael Newhard attributed the cause to water intrusion: “I believe water got into the system and created a spark and created a fire, just like last time.” (Spectrum News)
This “unauthorized, non-compliant system” finding is the detail supporters and opponents read in opposite directions, and it maps onto the larger policy choice. If a fire happened because a specific unit was operating out of compliance, that strengthens the case for enforced standards — the failure was of oversight, not of the technology as such. If the same site burns twice despite scrutiny, that strengthens the case for prohibition — as Warwick Town Supervisor Jesse Dwyer put it, “two fires at the same site in a short span of time is not an anomaly — it is a warning.” (Spectrum News) The site does not resolve that judgment; it documents both readings of the same facts.
Three features make these fires different from an ordinary structure fire, and they are well established in fire-service and research literature:
This is where evidence matters more than impression. EPRI, the electric-power research institute, maintains a public BESS Failure Incident Database. It finds that the failure rate per unit of deployed capacity “dropped by 99% from 2018 to 2025” even as installed capacity grew sharply, as lessons from early failures were built into newer designs. (EPRI) EPRI’s root-cause analysis also finds most failures trace to integration, controls, and balance-of-system equipment rather than the battery cells themselves, and that a large share occur during construction, commissioning, or the first couple of years of operation — a pattern consistent with Warwick’s defective-enclosure and compliance problems.
Two caveats keep this honest. First, no jurisdiction requires incident reporting, so EPRI “cannot guarantee that the database captures every relevant BESS failure incident,” and the totals are an undercount; the rate is falling, but absolute incident counts have not vanished. Second, a falling rate is cold comfort to a town hosting the unit that fails. Relatedly, the industry has shifted toward lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cells, which research generally finds have a higher thermal-runaway onset temperature and lower peak heat release than the older NMC chemistry. That is a real difference — but LFP cells still undergo thermal runaway and still vent toxic gas, and the comparative gas-toxicity evidence is still developing, so LFP should be read as lower-risk, not fire-safe.
The governing safety standard is NFPA 855, the National Fire Protection Association’s Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy Storage Systems, which sets requirements for unit spacing, fire detection and suppression, explosion control, commissioning tests, and emergency-response planning. (NFPA)
New York responded to its 2023 fires directly. After incidents in Jefferson, Orange (Warwick), and Suffolk counties, Governor Hochul convened an Inter-Agency Fire Safety Working Group (July 2023) spanning six state agencies, which inspected 57 in-service projects and issued recommendations. (NYSERDA) Its initial recommendations (February 2024) covered emergency-response planning, local fire-department training, peer review of permit applications, and removing a fire-code exemption for utility-owned storage. (Governor’s Office) Those became updated 2025 NYS Fire Code provisions, adopted July 25, 2025 and effective January 1, 2026. (NYSERDA) This is the “enforced standards” path made concrete — the state’s answer to the same risk that towns are answering with moratoria.
Warwick is why fire safety is the single most common theme in the opposition documented across this site. The fire is real, the hazards are real, and the off-site impact at Warwick was real but limited — all at once. The genuinely unsettled question is what follows from that: tighter siting and operating standards applied through local review (and now the 2026 state code), or prohibition through the moratoria and bans catalogued on the landscape page. That is a values judgment about acceptable risk, and reasonable people land in different places; the role here is to give them the verified facts — the incident record, the science, the falling-but-nonzero failure rate, and the rules — to weigh, not to make the call for them.
The U.S. Fire Administration explains the firefighting challenge; EPRI’s Failure Incident Database tracks the incident record and trend; and New York’s Inter-Agency Fire Safety Working Group page collects the state’s inspections, recommendations, and the resulting code.